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Abstract 
Short sale has been mostly associated with decrease in the equity market’s volatility, and increase in the equity market’s liquidity, 
this paper examines the volatility and the liquidity of the 55 stocks that are eligible for regulated short sale (RSS) before and after 
the reintroduction of RSS. First, this study utilizes both the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, and the GARCH (1,1) 
model in order to analyze the impact of the reintroduction of RSS on the 55 stocks’ volatility. Second, this study also utilizes the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and the bid-ask spread to determine whether the reintroduction of RSS has any 
significant impact on the 55 stocks liquidity. The results show that the volatility and the liquidity of the 55 stocks significantly 
increase after the reintroduction of RSS. In addition, through the GARCH (1,1) model, it was found that the market is more 
efficient after the reintroduction of RSS due to increase in the impact of recent news and decrease in the impact old news on the  
55 stocks’ volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
A short sale is a trading strategy that allows investors to capitalize on an expected decline in the price of a 
security. In Malaysia, short sale was previously prohibited from being utilized in any form or shape. However, as an 
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effort to further develop the Malaysian financial market; regulated short sale (RSS) was introduced in Bursa 
Malaysia on 30th September 1996. According to RSS, only prescribed stocks that are determined by the Bursa 
Malaysia are approved for short selling. In addition, the short selling activity must adhere to rules and regulation that 
have been designed by the Malaysian Securities Commission (MSC). Most importantly, RSS only allow covered 
short selling as naked short selling is prohibited. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian Securities 
Commission (MSC) banned the utilization of RSS on 28th August 1997 in the pretext of preventing excessive 
volatility in the financial markets. However, in February 2001, it launched a plan, Capital Market Masterplan, which 
recommends the re-introduction of RSS and securities lending activities. However, the recommendation was not 
realized until 3rd January 2007 when the ban on the RSS was lifted. According to Bursa Malaysia, RSS was 
reintroduced to Malaysian financial market to match the needs of issuers with investor requirements, to contribute to 
greater liquidity, and to enhance the overall vibrancy of the Malaysian market. 
2. Literature Review 
A study on effectiveness of the 2008 short sale ban during the 2008 financial crisis had discovered that the 
market volatilities at both the individual stock level and market level are higher in the ban period than the pre-ban 
periods. Overall, although the results of the study indicate that the short-sales ban is successful in preventing a 
market crash via the mitigation of extreme negative returns, it also prove that the ban increases the volatility of the 
equity market as stated by Nguyen and Tang (2011). Similar result is found as in Lobanova et al. (2010) where they 
investigated the effect of short sale constraints, i.e. the short sale ban, on the equity market’s volatility, liquidity and 
efficiency. They have discovered that there were statistically significant changes in liquidity, volume, and return 
volatility before and during the ban and during and after the ban. Specifically, the equity market’s returns decreases, 
the volatility of returns increases, and the liquidity deteriorates during the ban. Hence, the brief short-sales bans 
during the 2008 financial crisis shows that stocks that were banned experience a higher decline in liquidity in 
comparison to control stocks (stocks that were not subjected to the ban). This effect is especially prevalent among 
high caps stocks than low caps stock (Boehmer et al., 2013; Lobanova et al., 2010; and Nguyen & Tang, 2011). In 
addition, a study on cross-sectional variation in the returns on the abovementioned banned stocks discover that 
stocks which are subjected to the ban mostly experience a significant widening in bid-ask spreads (the greater the 
bid-ask spread, the less liquid a stock is). On top of that, the illiquidity effect is greater in those banned stocks than 
stocks that were not subjected to the ban as in Don et al. (2011). There are a few studies on Hong Kong stock market 
regarding the effect of short sale where the results reasserting conclusion as demonstrated in Chang et al. (2007) 
where they discovered that short sale existence causes higher volatility, lower liquidity, and lower efficiency in 
market returns  (Chen & Zheng, 2009; Henry & McKenzie, 2006). In conclusion, based on the majority of the 
studies, it is clear that short sale, if it is implemented effectively, has a desirable impact on liquidity, volatility, the 
efficiency of the equity market. 
3. Data and Methodology 
The study period will be two years before and after the reintroduction of RSS. There are originally seventy stocks 
that are allowed for RSS and available in the Bursa Malaysia website. Daily stock price and the daily trading volume 
are collected for only fifty five stocks, from the possible seventy, since BursaStation does not have the historical 
data for other fifteen stocks due to various reasons (e.g. removal from RSS). In the data preparation, we average the 
daily proxies for each stock for the whole duration of the studies to create one cohesive time series data. Eligible 
stocks for RSS will have to meet the required market capitalization and trading volumes and they must have (1) 
average daily market capitalization of more than RM500 million for the past 3 months, (2) at least 50 million shares 
in public float and (3) average monthly volume traded of more than 1 million units for the past 12 calendar months. 
3.1. Analyzing Volatility And Liquidity 
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Three methods are used to analyze the volatility and liquidity of the 55 stocks before and after the reintroduction 
of RSS. 
A) Non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test. 
The following proxies to both liquidity and volatility have been tested for normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test and the Shapiro-Wilk test. It was found that liquidity and volatility are not normal, we then used the non-
parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test to determine whether there are significant changes in view to 
those proxies before and after the reintroduction of RSS. The first proxy to volatility is daily squared return as 
demonstrated in Lobanova et al. (2010) where the higher the daily squared return of a stock, the more volatile a 
stock is. The daily return is calculated by the following equation; where itP  is the stock i closing price at time t, 1itP  
is the stock i closing price at time t-1. The second proxy to volatility is the daily volatility measure as demonstrated 
in Chen & Zheng (2009). Where itV  is the daily volatility, HitP  is the highest price of the stock i on day t, LitP  is the 
lowest price of the stock i on day t. 
)/ln( 1 ititit PPR           (1) 
)2//()( LHLHit itititit PPPP  V          (2) 
Although there are finer and better proxy to liquidity such as demonstrated by Cliftonab & Snapeac (2008), proxy 
to liquidity, according to Amihud (2002) those measures require a lot of microstructure data which are not 
accessible in various stock markets especially in the developing financial market. In addition, even when those data 
are available, they do not cover very long periods of time. This is particularly true for the Malaysian equity market 
where the bid-ask spreads, which is an important indicator for liquidity is not readily available. Therefore, this study 
used illiquidity as shown by Amihud (2002) as the first proxy to liquidity; Where itR  is the daily trading returns of 
the stock i at day t, tV  is the ringgit trading volumes of the stock i at day t. It is equal to trading volumes at day t 
multiply with the closing price at day t. 
tit VRyIlliquiditAmihud /         (3) 
The bid-ask spreads for the Malaysian equity market cannot be obtained easily. However, there is a new method 
to effectively estimate bid-ask spread from daily high and low prices as developed by Corwin and Schultz (2012). 
Therefore, the second proxy to liquidity, which is the high-low bid-ask spread estimator is calculated via the 
following equation: 
)1/()]1(2[ DD eeS           (4) 
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From the equations, D  is a high-low price spread estimator, E  is the summation of squared high-low price 
spread. J  is the squared high-low price spread, S  is the stock’s high low bid-ask spread estimator, tH  is the 
stock’s high price on day t, tL  is the stock’s low price on day t, 1, ttH  is the stock highest price over the two days t, 
and t+1, and lastly 1, ttL  is the stock lowest price over the two days t, and t+1. Meanwhile, as established in 
Lobanova et al. (2010), we utilize the daily trading volumes as the third proxy to liquidity. Stocks with a high 
volume are generally considered to be very liquid as a result of having lower spreads between the bids and ask 
prices. We average the value for the 55 stocks over the pre-RSS period (before the reintroduction of RSS) and post-
RSS period (after the reintroduction of RSS). Next, we are interested in the median of the differences in means for 
each group. Therefore, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test is used and the null hypothesis will only be rejected if the p-
value for the test is less than 0.05 (5%) to show that there is a significance change for the particular variable tested. 
x Null Hypothesis: Median variable post RSS – Median variable pre RSS = 0 
x Research Hypothesis: Median variable post RSS – Median variable pre RSS ≠ 0 
B) GARCH (1,1) model  
This study follows the method according to Alves and Mendes (2012); Ho (1996); Ringgenberg (2011); and 
Sarangi and Patnaik (2006) where we utilize the GARCH (Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity) (1,1) model to measure the volatility of the 55 stocks before and after the reintroduction of RSS. 
The main reason for using GARCH (1,1) model instead of simply relying on the standard deviation of the abnormal 
return is to overcome the heteroscedasticity problem that exists on the daily return data. Referring to the model as 
exemplify by Alves (2012), the following are the mean and the variance equation based on the GARCH (1,1) model 
as in equation 8 and equation 9; where tR  is the 55 stock’s average daily return as measured by equation 1, mtR  is 
the daily return on the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI as measured by equation 1, 2 1tH  which is also known the ARCH 
value, is the past squared residuals which represents the effect of recent news to the volatility of 55 stocks. It is 
measured as lag of the squared residuals from mean equation, which is equation 8, 2 1th  which is also known the 
GARCH value, is the lagged values of variance itself to capture long-term effects on volatility, RSSD  is the dummy 
variable which takes the value 0 for pre-reintroduction of RSS and 1 for post-reintroduction of RSS. 
tmtitt RR HED           (8) 
RSSttt Dh TUHOOH   2 112 1102         (9) 
Basically, the coefficient of the dummy variable determines the direction of changes in regard to the volatility of 
the 55 stocks before and after the reintroduction of RSS. Therefore, if the coefficient has a negative value and it is 
statistically significant at 5% confidence interval, then it can be proved that there is a decline in the volatility of the 
55 stocks after the reintroduction of RSS and vice-versa. On the other hand, if the coefficient has a value of 0, then 
there is no change in the volatility. Lastly, the value of the coefficient will determine the magnitude of the changes. 
The GARCH model can also be used to explicate the volatility structure where we divide the sample in two distinct 
periods, pre-reintroduction of RSS and post-reintroduction of RSS. Next, we regressed the GARCH (1,1) model for 
each periods to directly compare the nature of the volatility in each period. ARCH is the coefficient of the square of 
the error term, and demonstrates the effect of recent news to the 55 stocks volatility. GARCH is the coefficient of 
the lagged variance term and it elucidates the effect of the old news to the 55 stocks volatility. If the value of ARCH 
pre-reintroduction of RSS is greater than post-reintroduction of RSS, then it indicates that the effect of the recent 
news on the volatility of 55 stocks has declined in the post-RSS period and vice-versa. Next, if the value of GARCH 
pre-reintroduction of RSS is greater than post-reintroduction of RSS, then it indicates that the effect of the old news 
on the 55 stocks’ volatility has declined in the post-RSS period and vice-versa. 
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C) Bid-ask spread model 
 
We measure the impact of the reintroduction of RSS towards liquidity by using a regression model as 
demonstrated by Lobanova et al. (2010). From the equation 10, tS  denotes the daily average High Low Bid-Ask 
Spread Estimator for the 55 stocks at time t as measured by equation 4, 2trD  is the 55 stocks’ daily average return 
squared at time t, itvD  is the 55 stocks’ daily average volume at time t, itev  is the 55 stock’s daily average excess 
trading volume at time t. Daily excess trading volume is equal to the daily trading volume minus the average daily 
trading volume for the duration of the study, RSSD  is the dummy variable which takes the value 0 for pre-
reintroduction of RSS and 1 for post-reintroduction of RSS. Again, similar to analysis in regard to volatility, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable determines the direction of changes in regard to the liquidity of the 55 stocks 
before and after the reintroduction of RSS. If the coefficient has a negative value and it is statistically significant at 
5% confidence interval, then it can be proved that there is a decline in the 55 stocks’ liquidity after the 
reintroduction of RSS and vice-versa. Meanwhile, if the coefficient has a value of 0, then it also can indicate that 
there is no change in the 55 stocks’ liquidity after the reintroduction of RSS. Lastly, the value of the coefficient will 
determine the magnitude of the change. 
tRSSitittt DevvrS HEEDEDED  32120       (10) 
4. Analysis and Findings 
Table 1 shows the p-value for four test variables are less than 0.05, thus the result proves that there is a 
significant change for the four variables before and after the reintroduction of RSS. Meanwhile the p-values for the 
average daily Amihud illiquidity is greater than 0.05 indicating that there is no significance change in regard to 
average daily Amihud illiquidity before and after the reintroduction of RSS. 
 
   Table 1. The test for significance for the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test 
 Test Z Score P-value 
 Post RSS daily trading volume – Pre RSS daily trading volume -4.868 0.000 
 Post RSS daily volatility – Pre RSS daily volatility -6.435 0.000 
 Post RSS daily return squared – Pre RSS daily return squared -6.024 0.000 
 Post RSS Amihud illiquidity – Pre RSS Amihud illiquidity -1.24 0.603 
 Post RSS spread – Pre RSS spread -3.410 0.001 
 
According to Table 1, the p-value for average daily trading volumes, the average daily volatility, the average 
daily return squared, the average daily spread is less than 0.05, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the differences 
of median of each four variables before and after the reintroduction of RSS are equal to 0.00. As a result, this proves 
that there is a significant change for the four variables before and after the reintroduction of RSS. Meanwhile the p-
values for the average daily Amihud illiquidity is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
thus indicating that there is no significance change in regard to average daily Amihud illiquidity before and after the 
reintroduction of RSS. All in all, the findings shows that there are significant changes in regard to volatility (as 
measured by daily return squared and daily volatility) and liquidity (as measured by daily spread, and daily trading 
volume) before and after the reintroduction of RSS. Therefore, the discovery provides an indication that the 
reintroduction of RSS does significantly affect the volatility and the liquidity of the 55 stocks. 
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4.1. The Findings For GARCH (1,1) Model 
Table 2 reports the results of regression of the GARCH (1,1) model. The value of the coefficient of the dummy is 
positive (it is also significance), meaning that the volatility for the 55 stocks is higher after the reintroduction of 
RSS. This indicates that the reintroduction of RSS has a significant impact on the volatility of the Malaysian equity 
market. Therefore the study concludes that volatility for the 55 stocks has significantly increased after the 
reintroduction of RSS. Meanwhile, the value of the coefficient is 0.0052 which indicates that a 1% increase in the 55 
stocks’ average daily return, cause 0.52% increase in the 55 stocks’ underlying volatility. 
  Table 2. Impact of RSS on the 55 stocks volatility 
 No. Test Closing Price Returns 
 1 Variable Coefficients P-value 
 2 Constant  0.0000732 0.7315 
 3 FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI’s daily return 1.1024 0.0718 
 4 ARCH 1 0.1174 0.0000* 
 5 GARCH 1 0.8176 0.0000* 
 6 RSS DUMMY 0.0052 0.0322* 
 *Significance at 5% confidence interval 
 




 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
 Constant 0.000000407 0.5549 00001.05 0.0879 
 ARCH (1) 0.099778 0.0032* 0.111603 0.0055* 
 GARCH (1) 0.088711 0.0000* 0.0702990 0.0000* 
 *Significance at 5% level 
Meanwhile, Table 3 exhibits the structure of the Malaysian equity market volatility before and after the 
reintroduction of RSS (The technique of doing this is explained in the previous section). The estimates show that co-
efficient ARCH was 0.099778 before the reintroduction of RSS and 0.111603 after the reintroduction RSS. It shows 
an increase in the coefficient of the ARCH after the reintroduction of RSS, which indicate that there is an increase in 
the impact of the recent news on the 55 stocks volatility in the post-reintroduction of RSS. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of the GARCH is 0.088711 in pre-reintroduction of RSS and 0.0702990 in post-reintroduction of RSS. 
Therefore, it indicates that the effect of the old news has declined in the post-reintroduction of RSS. The overall 
results show that in the post-reintroduction of RSS, there has been an increase in the impact of recent news to the 55 
stocks’ volatility and at the same time, a decline in the GARCH coefficient shows that the impact of old news has 
declined. According to Sarangi and Patnaik (2006), increase in the effect of new news and decrease in the effect of 
old new may suggest increase in market efficiency. 
4.2. The Findings For The Bid-Ask Spread model 
Table 4 shows the result of the model regression; the value of the coefficient of the dummy is negative 
(significance), meaning that the liquidity for the Malaysian equity market is higher (lower bid-ask spread results in 
higher liquidity) after the reintroduction of RSS. 
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  Table 4. Impact of RSS on the 55 stocks liquidity 
 No Test Closing Price Returns 
 1 Variable Coefficients P-value 
 2 Constant  0.002194 0.0024* 
 3 The 55 stocks’ daily average trading volume 0.046421 0.0000* 
 4 The 55 stocks’ daily average excess trading volume 0.032610 0.0056* 
 5 The 55 stocks’  daily average  return squared 0.586950 0.0753** 
 6 RSS DUMMY -0.02940 0.03123* 
 *, ** denotes the significance at 5% and 10% confidence interval 
 
It concludes that liquidity of the 55 stocks has significantly increased after the reintroduction of RSS. Whereas, 
the value of the coefficient is 0.02940 which indicates that a 1% increase in the 55 stocks’ average daily spread 
causes 2.94% decrease in the 55 stocks underlying liquidity. 
5. Conclusion 
In regard to the volatility, the findings demonstrate that volatility significantly increased after the reintroduction 
of RSS. In addition, according to the GARCH (1,1) model, the impact of new news to the 55 stocks’ volatility is 
greater after the reintroduction of RSS and the impact of old news to the 55 stocks’ volatility is lower after the 
reintroduction of the 55 stocks. It suggests that the market is more efficient after the reintroduction of RSS. As 
mentioned before, one of the objectives of the reintroduction of RSS is to increase the liquidity of Malaysia financial 
market. The findings also found that the 55 stocks’ liquidity does significantly increase after the reintroduction of 
RSS. Therefore, it can be used as justification to confirm the validity of the aforementioned objective. If short sale is 
implemented correctly, it has desirable effects on the equity market via the minimization of volatility, and increase 
in liquidity (as in Chen & Zhen (2009); Ho (1996); Lobanova et al. (2010)). Meanwhile, there are also other studies 
although they are in minority, which state the otherwise (Chang et al., (2007); Henry & McKenzie (2006)). In this 
study, we discovered that RSS does not fit the mold of either type of study as it significantly increases both volatility 
and the liquidity of the 55 stocks. It can only speculate that the design and implementation of RSS does not emulate 
the design and implementation of short sale in developed financial market. We recommend studying the impacts of 
RSS on the liquidity and volatility of the entire Malaysia equity market before and after the reintroduction of RSS 
for future study. The future research can use the panel data approach to take care of time series and cross-sectional 
data problem. 
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